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My brief is to discuss the ways in which English Contract and Tort law might
develop in the rest of the century. 1 The time is propitious for such a review since
of the four great figures who have done so much to shape the development of
Contract and Tort law since the war - Lord Denning, Lord Diplock, Lord Reid
and Lord Wilberforce,2 three have recently departed from the courts, Lord
Denning and Wilberforce by retirement and Lord Diplock, alas, by death. This
permits, and perhaps requires, a pause for reflection and regrouping.
If an attempt to answer the question is rash, the posing of the question itself
makes some assumptions which are not self evident. To foretell the future assumes
that progress will have at least a significant rational element. One of our greatest
livinghistorians, A.J. P. Taylor, has often argued that on the whole things happen
by accident and are not the product of determinist trends. It is difficult not to feel
that there is at least a significant accidental element in the development of
common law through the process of deciding cases. In a sense the law is at the
mercy of litigants since if no litigant brings a question before the courts and in
particular if no appellant brings it before the House of Lords, developments which
are possible may be held up for generations. For instance it seems probable that if
some suitable case with appropriate facts had come before the House of Lords in
the seventies, they would have taken the opportunity to abolish or at least seriously
to qualifYthe doctrine of privity of contract. Even when cases do come before the
Lords, much may tum on accidents of timing. So it is plausible to speculate that if
the La Pintada3 case had come before the House of Lords befOre the Law
Commission had recommended the abolition of the general rule that interest was
not payable on debts in the absence of agreement,4 their Lordships might have
" Professor of Law, University of Bristol.
1. A revised version of a paper given at a symposium on Anglo-Japanese Law at the University of
Warwick on 19 December 1986. 1am grateful to Hugh Beale and Keith Stamon for comments on an
earlier draft.
2. The order is alphabetical.
3. [1985] A.C.104.
4. Law Commission No 88, Cmnd. 7229.
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taken the opportunity to overturn this long-entrenched but barely justifiable rule.
Even where a problem occurs so frequently that it is almost inevitable that sooner
or later it will come before the courts, much may turn on the way in which the
merits appear in the particular case, on the forensic tactics used by counsel and
indeed, on the composition of the House of Lords itself. It is not absurd to suggest
that if Donoghuev. Stevenson5 had been decided by a majority of3:2 in the opposite
direction, English law would look rather different today than it does. Professor
Schwartz has recently explained the decision of the plaintiff in the important
Californian case of J'aire6 to pursue an apparently speculative claim in tort rather
than a clear cut claim in contract against a different defendant on the basis of the
confession of the plaintiff's attorney that "contracts was never my subject in law
school".?
Despite all these qualifications many common lawyers looking back into the past
will find lines of development which seem, at least in retrospect, logically coherent
if not inevitable. Is it entirely a coincidence that the American courts in McPherson
v. Buick8 reached substantially the same result as the English courts in Donoghue v.
Stevenson?9 May there not be something in the logic of the system or the needs of
the times which produces similar results in similar places. One of the revelations of
comparative law, indeed, is how often the logic of different systems seems to lead
to the same result, presumably because of the need to respond to similar social
problems. When we turn from case law to legislation, though it is true that most
academic lawyers despair from time to time of the possibility of Parliament
pursuing rational policies in law reform, it is true that in retrospect one can identifY
developments such as the introduction of Criminal Appeals or the right of the
accused to testifY at his own criminal trial, which seem inevitable even though at
the time they were highly contentious and violently resisted.
To continue at this point therefore, indicates a belief that one can have at least a
stab at identifYing the future by looking at what has taken place over the last
twenty-five years and trying to identifY in what directions development seems to
follow from this.
Prediction of future trends assumes the ability to identify the relevant forces for
change. Without being clearly able to ascribe a precise weight to different forces I
start by assuming in what follows that change is partly fuelled by the perceived
inherent logic of the system amongst its practitioners; partly by a response to the
perceived needs of society as revealed by the accidents of litigation and partly by
the choice of subjects for legislative law reform. In this respect a factor that seems
to me so far to have been underestimated is the switch to a wholly graduate entry
5. [1932] A.C.S62.
6. 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P. 2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr 407 (1979).
7. In The Law of Tort: Policies atld Trends ill Liability for Damage to Property alld Ecollomic Loss ed.
Furmston (Duckworth, 1986), at p.86.
8. 217 NY 382,111 NE IOSO(1916).
9. [1932] A.C.S62.
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into the profession which will mean within a generation a wholly graduate
profession. These graduates will be overwhelmingly law graduates and even those
who are not law graduates will have received at least two years of systematic
instruction in the law. I find it difficult to believe that this will not have a
substantial effect on the way in which future generations of lawyers will analyse
legal problems. Most of us, if we are honest, will admit that many of our ideas were
fixed at an early age by the conceptual structure of the subjects as they were taught
to us. If this is true then internal developments within university law schools in the
way in which the subject is taught will in their turn have effects on how
practitioners perceive problems.
The relationship of contract and tort
One of the most interesting questions which the courts will have to work out over
the next twenty years is the relationship between Contract and Tort. This has a
number of aspects. One is attempts by a plaintiff to allege that he has a claim in tort
even though he has a claim in contract against the same defendant arising out of
the same facts. This problem has in practice arisen primarily in the context of
limitation. In this context the fact that the limitation period in contract starts when
the contract is broken but that in tort starts when the plaintiff suffers damage
means that there may be significant advantages in suing in tort rather than contract
for this purpose. After an initial rejection of this possibility by Diplock L. J. sitting
as a High Court judge in Bagot v. Stevens, Scanlan,1O it was accepted in a very full
and carefully reasoned judgment by Oliver J. in Midland Bank v. Hett Stubbs and
Kemp.ll This decision was expressly approved by the Court of Appeal in Batty v.
Metropolitan Realisations Limitei2 and in the leading House of Lords decision of
Pirelli v. Faber,13 the defendant did not even think it worth while to argue that the
plaintiff, who undoubtedly had a good but statute barred claim in contract could
not pursue a claim in tort on the same facts.
The only discordant note in this picture is the opinion of the Privy Council in
Tai Hing Cotton Mill Limited v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Limited.]4 In this case Lord
Scarman said, "Their Lordships do not believe that there is anything to the
advantage of the law's development in searching for a liability in tort where the
parties are in a contractual relationship." On one view this might be taken as
disapproval of the reasoning in Midland Bank but it seems in fact unlikely that this
is so. Certainly courts in cases after Tai Hing have continued to treat the Midland
Bank approach as entirely correct in the limitation context.15 In interpreting Tai
Hing it is important to note that the Privy Council was first of all invited to extend
10. [1966] I QB.197.
II. [1979] Ch.384.
12. [1978] QB.554.
13. [1983] 2 A.C.1j see Furmston, 1 COIIStroctionL.R.25.
14. [1985] 2 All E.R.947.
15. See, e.g., London Congregational Union v. Harriss (1986) 8 Constroction L.R.S2
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the implied obligations of the customer to his bank in contract; then when that
approach was rejected, to outflank its own decision by holding the customer as
under a duty of care in tort. It seems entirely rational to say that the underlying
policy considerations were identical whether the question was posed as a contract
or a tort question and should therefore receive the same answer.16 It would be
strikingly inconvenient if the Tai Ring opinion were applied in the limitation
context since it seems clear that the Latent Damage Act 1986 assumes the
correctness of Midland Bank. One of the paradoxes of this area was that Lord
Scarman sat in Pirelli v. Faber and was one of the principal architects of the Latent
Damage Act 1986.
Another development has been an attempt by plaintiffs to invoke the law of tort
in order to outflank the problems presented by the law of contract, particularly the
doctrine of privity of contract. These attempts mirror in a way attempts by previous
generations in cases such as De La Bere v. Pearson 17 to overcome defects in the law
of tort (particularly the absence of liability for careless statements) by stretching
the law of contract. Some of these developments are discussed below in relation to
economic loss.
Some scholars have deduced from these developments that the law of contract
and tort are coalescing.18 Some, indeed, have spoken of the emergence of
"contort" or the death of contract. Undoubtedly, it is now important for contract
and tort lawyers to be aware of developments in each others' subjects, but for the
moment developments seem rather to emphasise the distinction between contract
and tort than to mark their confluence. If the law in tort and contract were indeed
flowing in a single channel, the results of cases would have surely been the same,
whether they were formulated in contract or tort. To permit a plaintiff who has
failed in contract to succeed in tort on identical facts against the same defendant,
or vice versa, seems rather to point up the distinctiveness of the rules than to reflect
their assimilation.
Of course there must be serious doubts when different results are produced on
the same facts, according to which of two apparently equally valid analyses are
adopted. This result, however, seems inevitable, unless one is to go down the
French road and adopt the rule of non-cumul.19 If we take the case of defective
16. The present writer must confess to grave doubts as to whether the Privy Council ought not to
have accepted the invitation to develop the law in this area by widening liability in contract. The
effective question in the case was, who should bear the risk of the plaintiffs dishonest servant. Since
even the most elementary precautions by the plaintiffs would have revealed his dishonesty at an early
stage, it seems hard to apportion all the loss onto the bank since it is much more difficult to see what
practical steps the bank could have taken to reduce the chances of loss. It is of course entirely
understandable that the Privy Council should not wish to have gone to the other extreme and held that
all customers were under obligation to check their statements. One wonders, however, whether it were
not possible to develop some distinction between commercial and private customers in this area.
17. [1908] 1 K.B.280.
18. See particularly Cane in The Law of Tort, supra n.7, ch.6.
19. See Herbots in The Law of Tort, supra n.7, ch.7 at p.139.
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buildings, it is clear that some plaintiffs will only have actions in torts; for instance,
because they did not contract with the person who is at fault. In the case of such
plaintiffs, limitation periods would inevitably start when damage is suffered. Some
other plaintiffs will have a choice of suing in contract or tort but it would be
difficult to justifY their tort claims being rejected simply because their contract
claims had been rejected when they had neighbours who were in a different
position. That might mean that the second hand buyer could sue the developer
when the first purchaser could not.
Tort
Collapse of the personal injury system?
I cannot myself believe that our existing system for personal injury will continue
unreformed into the indefinite future. The criticisms of the existing system have
been too often and too well rehearsed to justifY repetition here.2o Suffice it to say
that the existing system consumes an unacceptably large amount of resources in its
operation and that in practice it spreads the compensation monies across those
injured in a way which is totally erratic, irrational and unjustifiable. Sometimes
when I make this statement I am told by the audience that vested interests in the
present system are too strong for it not to survive. I am reluctant to believe this and
contrariwise encouraged by signs that the medical profession is beginning to see
the attractions of a system that does not require repeated enquiries into the
carelessness of doctors.21 A struggle between the vested interests of doctors on the
one hand and personal injury lawyers and insurance companies on the other would
be interesting to watch. I think I know which horse I would back.
Growth of professional negligence litigation
The last twenty years have seen a major growth in the willingness of plaintiffs to
sue their professional advisors. If one is concerned with a plaintiff who brings a
contract action against his own advisor, there has been very little formal change in
the law here but a marked increase in willingness to sue. If one considers claims
formulated in tort, whether against one's own advisor or against other people's
advisors, there has been an explosion of liability since Hedley Byrne including such
decisions as Ross v. Caunters which would have appeared unthinkable thirty years
ago. If we make the plausible assumption that in this field English courts will go
some way down the American road, this suggests further geometric increase in
professional liability actions. Stories, obviously inspired, now regularly appear in
the papers about the burdens of insuring against professional negligence and
professional bodies, indeed, have grouped together to seek to persuade the
government to impose statutory limits on negligence liability. The attraction of this
is said to be that it would make insurance problems significantly easier to
20. See, for instance, Atiyah,Accidents, Compensation and the Law.
21. See, e.g., Stirrat, [19861101 Bristol Medico-Chirurgical Journal.
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overcome. It seems likely however, that the government will resist these
blandishments. In any case, it is hardly likely that public opinion would tolerate any
limit which was not so large as to leave only a very small number of claims over the
limit. It is rumoured that some large firms of accountants have been sued for sums
well into nine figures. It seems very doubtful whether judgments of this size could
be effectively enforced against the partners of a firm, however large, if it was well
in excess of their insurance limit. In any case, if a careless accountant actually
causes loss of this scale it is not self-evident that he should not bear it so far as he
is able or insured, unless it can be shown that it would be much cheaper and more
efficient for the victim to insure. A priori this seems doubtful.
It is no doubt a legitimate question whether tort actions for professional
negligence are in fact the appropriate way to improve levels of professional
competence. There are however, serious grounds for doubt as to how widespread
competence is. The professions have only recently begun to bestir themselves in
this respect. In particular, granted the complexity and rapid evolution of modern
professional skills, the relatively modest programmes of post-qualification
continuing education so far adopted are very much a first step. If the professions
seek special treatment the least the public should demand in return is that the
professions themselves should demonstrate heroic efforts to raise standards.
The development of the tort of negligence
If one had been asked to present this paper in 1982, the discussion of this section
would have appeared much easier. Up until that period the post-war developments
appeared to reflect a consistent trend towards a hegemony of the tort of negligence
within tort law. By this I mean two rather separate developments - the one is a
movement away from strict liability, at least in respect of the central area of
damage to person and property. So successful actions under the rule in Rylands v.
Pletcher are nowadays virtually unknown and the tort of nuisance has been afflicted,
admittedly to a degree difficult to define precisely, by ideas of negligence.22
In 1982, one would have been inclined to discount as an immediate possibility
the one major departure from this trend which is now evident, that is, the
introduc.tion by statute of a strict liability regime for products. Although I welcome
this development as an improvement on the present law, it is not easy to think of a
principled reason for introducing this regime for products only and continuing to
operate a negligence regime for road accidents. Only the almost fortuitous fact that
it is possible to think of plausible EEC constitutional reasons for a uniform regime
for products but so far impossible to think of similar reasons for a uniform regime
for car accidents produces this change. In any case, the existing reform is probably
not a very great step forward since the permission of the development risk defence
will introduce some questions of fault and in any case the need to operate through
the legal system and the possibility of raising defences based on causation or
22. See particularly The Wagon Mound (No 2) [1967] I A.C.617.
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contributory negligence will mean that the plaintiff will often fall short of full
recovery. To this writer at least, strict liability appears a second best alternative to a
socially funded scheme. The development does underline however the importance
of membership of the EEC as a reason for legislative initiatives.
When I talk of the hegemony of negligence I have also, perhaps more
importantly, in mind the apparently inevitable assumption that a defendant who
has been negligent should always be liable. So during the sixties, seventies and
early eighties, a number of apparently well established exceptions to this principle
crumbled away. The special treatment of buildings appeared to collapse in the face
of Dutton v. Bognor Regis23 and Anns v. Merton;24 the special treatment of nervous
shock was made much less special by McLoughlin v. 0 'Brian;25 the special
immunity of careless statements was removed by Hedley Byrne26 and its successors,
and an apparently major inroad into immunity for the negligent causing of pure
economic loss was made by the decision in Junior Books v. Veitchi.27 In 1982,
immediately after Junior Books v. Veitchi, it was plausible to assume that English law
would find it very difficult to find a stopping place short of complete surrender to
the principle that careless defendants would always be liable.28 This was puzzling
since the forces which fuelled this development seemed to be entirely conceptual.
The notion that he who is careless must pay seemed to be an idea whose time had
come. In this respect I cannot help thinking that it was significant that in a very
large number of leading negligence cases the court was deciding, without knowing
what the facts were, because for procedural reasons the defendant had chosen to
fight on the basis that although he was careless he owed no duty of care to the
defendant. So for instance, in Donoghue v. Stevenson,29 Hedley Byrne v. Heller,3o
Dorset Yacht v. Home Office,3) Rondel v. Worsley,32 Anns v.Merton33 and Junior Books
v. Veitchi,34 the court was in effect invited to take the defendant's carelessness as
read. In several of these cases the defendant had possible arguments that he was
not careless but these were not considered by the court. Is it not plausible to
suggest that that circumstance deprived the court of that perception of the real
balance of advantages and balancing of risks which would have emerged from a
careful evaluation of the facts as a preliminary to the development of the law?
23. [1972] 1 QB.373.
24. [1978] A.C.728.
25. [1983] 1 A.CA1O.
26. [1964] A.CA65.
27. [1983] 1 A.C.520.
28. For a fuller discussion of the position as it seemed after Junior Books see Stanton in The Law of




32. [1969] 1 A.C.191.
33. [1978] A.C.728.
34. [1983] 1 A.C.520.
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Whatever the merits of this argument, it seems clear that the period 1982 to
1986 has been marked by a complete stop in this development, if not indeed by a
V-tum. So such cases as The Aliakmon,35 Peabody v. Parkinson,36 Candlewood v.
Mitsui37 and Muirhead v. Industrial Tank38 indicate that the courts are certainly not
prepared to carry the decision in Junior Books one step further and indeed indicate
that given the right facts they might be prepared to push it a few steps backwards.
At the same time courts have been rebuffing attempts to introduce stricter forms of
liability in personal injury cases whether based on suing in battery (Chatterton v.
Gerson),39 on allegations of warranty (Thake v. Maurice)4o or use of "informed
consent" (Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal Hospital G(JVernors).41
Although some and perhaps all of these cases can be defended on the merits42
their cumulative effect is to present a conservative and indeed rather negative
posture. At a theoretical level the most important ingredient in the cases is the
attempt to resile from the two stage approach of Lord Wilberforce. In some cases
this appears to involve an abandonment or at least a downgrading of arguments
based on policy. As far as the law of economic loss is concerned, we seem to have
moved from a position in which one might say that sometimes one can recover for
it and sometimes not, to a position in which one can say sometimes one cannot
recover for it and sometimes one can! Neither the expansion of liability in Junior
Books nor its contraction in the later cases can be said to present a coherent
principled exposition of where the line is to be drawn between that economic loss
which is recoverable and that which is not. It is clear that some cases of recoverable
economic loss still exist, particularly in relation to careless statements (and there
has been no suggestion that Ross v. Caunters43 is wrongly decided). One who looks
to the future has to guess whether recent developments are simply a halting point
in the march forward or whether there is indeed a reversal. In this respect one may
perhaps draw attention to another factor in the development of the common law by
judicial decision which I call the revulsion factor. After each of the most important
steps forward such as Donoghue v. Stevenson44 and Hedley Byrne v. Heller,45 we tend
to have a period of five or ten years in which judges cannot actually believe the
evidence of their eyes. So cases decided in the thirties and forties often indicated a
35. [1986] 2 All E.R.l45.
36. [1985] A.C.21O.
37. [1986] A.C.1.
38. [1985] 3 All E.R.705.
39. [1981] QB.432.
40. [1986] 1 All E.R.497.
41. [1985] A.C.871.
42. Though not all the commentators have thought so. See, e.g., Clarke, [1986] C.L.J.382;
Markesinis, [1986] C.L.J.384. Parliament it seems, may have reversed TheA/ialemoll in a fit of absence
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reluctance to take Donoghue v. Stevenson as laying down general principles of the
kind which we now take for granted.
Similarly, the immediate post-Hedley Byrne cases, particularly Mutual Life v.
Evatt+6 but also a number of decisions at first instance, indicated a reluctance to
believe that the House of Lords had actually made the change it had. Yet in both
these cases, after a time, the broader view of the effect of the cases became
established within the collective wisdom of the profession which is in practice such
an important though intangible source of law making. It is not inconceivable that
the same process will happen with Junior Books v. Veitchi though it would perhaps
be a rash lawyer who would confidently predict that it would.
Contracts
It is possible to view the development of the law of contract as reflecting the
different weight given at different times to the values of freedom of contract and of
paternalism. Certainly many developments in the law of contract over the last
twenty-five years can be discussed in these terms.+7 For this purpose I am inclined
to put forward a thesis that this battle will never be won by one side or the other,
and that the real question is not whether paternalism should prevail over freedom
of contract or vice versa but where exactly the borderline between their respective
spheres of influence should lie.
Exemption clauses
One of the major battle areas in recent years has been the treatment of exemption
clauses. The substantive doctrine of fundamental breach as propounded by Lord
Denning in many cases in the Court of Appeal, represented an entirely
understandable attempt to ensure fair dealing for such consumers as purchasers of
shoddy second hand cars. It proved impossible however to develop a doctrine
which both worked and had real intellectual coherence. As Professor Brian Coote
has all too clearly exposed, a system which ignores the distinction between clauses
defining liability and clauses seeking to exclude a liability already accepted, will
run into endless difficulties. +8Furthermore at the pragmatic level the substantive
doctrine of fundamental breach ran into fatal difficulties when it attempted to
expand from the area of consumer protection into straightforward commercial
contracts as in Harbutts Plasticine+9 and Photo Produaion v. Securicor.50 In this
respect the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977 has undoubtedly permitted the
courts to move back to a more reasoned approach,S! confident that most of the
46. [197]] A.C.793.
47. See Collins, The Law of Contract (]986) and the reviews by Reynolds, 102 L.QR.628 and Weir,
[]986] C.L.J.503 for different views.
48. Exception Clauses (1964).
49. []970]] QB.447.
50. []980] A.C.827.




practical problems which have actually given rise to litigation in the past have been
taken care of, even though the Act exempts some transactions from its scope (such
as sales of land, and policies of insurance) where the case for so-doing is far from
clearly demonstrated.
One of the most controversial decisions implicit in the 1977 Act was the
granting of power to the courts to declare many exemption clauses in commercial
contracts void because unreasonable. Since businessmen are certainly entitled to
make foolish contracts in general, it is not wholly clear why they should be
prohibited from entering into foolish exemption terms. Furthermore it can be
plausibly argued that it is very difficult for a court to come to a decision on whether
a clause is or is not reasonable without an examination of the whole business
background and context which is unlikely to be possible in the forum of litigation
where the cost is likely to deter all but the most determined parties from
presenting the relevant business information to the court. It is striking in this
respect that the majority of decisions on reasonableness so far have tended to
reach the conclusion that the particular clause litigated was unreasonable. One
important message to contracting parties, is that they should employ lawyers who
can devise clauses which look reasonable rather than relying, as lawyers rather
evasively have in the past, on attempts to exclude liability for everything. In a
rational world this ought to lead to more contracts where liability is limited rather
than excluded and where the insurance burden is clearly determined by the
contract. Indeed, it is noticeable that in some of the most complex contracts such
as major building contracts, the very sensible practice of all the parties having a
single insurance policy with the same insurance company to cover all risks is now
widely adopted, thereby avoiding the possibility that the different insurance
companies will egg the parties on to litigation in order to shift the risk on to each
other (one might say in passing that the time must surely soon come when the
doctrine of subrogation is re-examined to see whether in practice it produces
desirable or undesirable results in terms of litigation).52
Certainty in commercial contraas
Outside the field of exemption clauses there have been a number of indications of
a swing back to valuing the virtues of certainty, particularly in commercial
contracts. I have in mind such decisions as Bunge v. Tradax53 indicating that in
appropriate circumstances the court will decide that a contractual term is a
condition, even though the parties have not formally so classified it, because of its
importance. Perhaps even more significant is the line of cases from the Laconia54
to the Chikuma,55 in which the House of Lords has rebuffed repeated attempts by
the Court of Appeal to permit relief to a party who pays a little late where the
52. Hasson, 5 OxfordJ.L.S.4I6.
53. [1981] 2 All E.R.513.
54. [1977] A.C.850.
55. [1981] 1 All E.R.652.
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contract entitles the other party to terminate for failure in prompt payment. The
refusal to spread the doctrine of relief against forfeiture into the area of
commercial contracts in such cases as Sport International Bussum v. Inter-Footwea~6
is part of the same trend. These developments have been accompanied by a more
elaborate and sophisticated analysis of the effect of breach of contract to which
both Lord Wilberforce57 and Lord Diplock58 made major contributions.
Difficulties may lie ahead however in deciding how far the decision of the majority
of the House of Lords in Hyundai v. Papadopoulos59 that termination leaves
unaffected pre-termination obligations to pay money is to be carried.
Consumer protection
I am inclined to think in general that change in the law of contract for the purposes
of consumer protection has now reached something near the limits of useful
development and that the steps which at least in the short term are required to
carry things forward are to be found either in the expansion of the Criminal Law or
in the provision of much cheaper, quicker methods of dispute settlement. It is
noticeable if one looks at the cases how few consumer durables give rise to
litigation outside the motor industry, and how many of the cases even within the
motor industry were brought by the finance companies who continued to insist on
payment in full for shoddy cars rather than by consumers asking for their money
back. It is I think clear, if one looks at the cases, that in nearly all of them the
consumer would in practice have been perfectly content to abandon the vehicle
and the money he had already paid, in order to get rid of the transaction. The
average consumer finds it difficult to complain and finds the thought of litigation
intolerable.
Inequality of bargaining power
One of the most stimulating and controversial initiatives by Lord Denning in the
field of Contract Law was his suggestion in Lloyds Bank v. Bundlo that there was a
general doctrine which could be drawn together from a number of specific
examples that a court would interfere with an agreement where one party had
taken unfair advantage of a superiority in his bargaining position. On the whole
this was received with a somewhat chilly response from English commentators on
the grounds that inequality of bargaining power is a vague notion, difficult to
describe, analyse or apply.61 The notion has also been received with less than
rapturous enthusiasm by many judges, particularly by the House of Lords, in
National Westminster Bank v. Morgan.62 It is notable, however, that in all the cases
56. [1984] 2 All E.R.321.
57. See, e.g.,}ohnson v. Agnew [1980] A.C.367.
58. See, e.g., Photo Production v. Securicor [1980] A.C.827.
59. [1980] 2 All E.R.29.
60. [1975] QB.326.
61. See, e.g., Treitel, The Law of Contract (6th edition 1983), pp.317-318.
62. [1985] A.C.686.
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where courts have been asked to apply the doctrine and have refused to do so, the
judges have been careful first of all to make it clear that the actual contract that
they were considering fell comfortably within the area of permissible negotiating
tactics. So in Bunnah Oil v. Bank of England,63 in Alec Lobb v. Total Oif4 and in
Morgan itself,65 the primary reason for the decision was that the contract was in
fact fair. Of course, to test the Denning thesis, we need to find a case in which a
judge will say that the contract is clearly unfair; that the parties were clearly in an
unequal bargaining position, but that the court can do nothing about it. I think it
may be some time before this case emerges! If this is correct, then we cannot yet
exclude the possibility that in a suitable case some court will feel that the existing
pigeon holes do not quite fit the case but that the case requires judicial
intervention. In such a case, an appeal may be made again to the spirit of Bundy. It
is noteworthy in this respect that Lord Denning's judgment has received much
more enthusiastic reception in Canada. Canadian contract law appears to be much
more open to the reception of this kind of broad-brush approach.66
Contraa theory
Some of the questions discussed above implicitly raise questions of what the law of
contract is about; what its objectives are and should be, and what is the underlying
basis of contractual obligation. These questions having been neglected for thirty
years are very much to the fore again. Professor Patrick Atiyah has argued in his
usual persuasive fashion that the underlying rationale of the law of contract is or
should be reliance rather than the satisfaction of expectations.67 So far I must
confess to finding the evidence that this is so less than wholly convincing, but the
debate is clearly a fruitful one. Questions about reliance are particularly important
in relation to the final resolution of doubts about promissory estoppel. It is an
illustration of both the strength and the weakness of evolution through the cases
that High Trees68 should have appeared as if from nowhere in 1947 but that we
should still be unsure forty years later where its precise limits lie. Similarly,
contract lawyers have learned much and will learn more from the application of
economic a!lalysis which has been particularly illuminating in the context of
contractual remedies. Indeed, the whole question of remedies, for so long a topic
shuffled off to the end of the course and the back of the book, has moved very
much to centre stage; an important example is the new debate as to whether
specific performance should be granted on a significantly wider basis than it has
63. (1981) Unreported.
64. [1985] 1 All E.R.303.
65. The different way in which the same facts are presented by the Court of Appeal [1983] 3 All
E.R.85 and the House of Lords is striking in this respect.
66. See, e.g., Monison v. Coast Finance (1965) 55 D.L.R. (2d) 710; Black v. Wi/cox (1976) 70 D.L.R.
(3d) 192; Waddams in Lord Denning: The Judge and the Laws Ch.lO.
67. See e.g., Atiyah, The Rise alld Fall of Freedom of Contract, pp.184-189; Promises, Morals and the Law,
pp.36-42; 102 L.QR. 363.
68. [1947] K.B.130.
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been in the past. As I was writing an earlier draft of these words I received in the
post a report of the decision in Posner v. Scott-Lewis69 (a happily named case!?)
where specific performance was granted of an agreement by a landlord to provide a
residential porter in a block of flats. This was a classic example of a stipulation
which could not be adequately compensated by a payment of d"lmages but where
authority might well have persuaded judges twenty or thirty years ago not to accede
to an application for specific performance.
69. [1986] 3 All E.R.513.
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